Germany To Rely On Coal To Avoid Blackouts

Exclusive: An internal SPD document reveals a shift by the Minister of Economics on the coal phase-out.

It was the big project for the green transformation of electricity generation in Germany – and perhaps the most dazzling energy policy project of Germany’s coalition government: After the nuclear phase-out and the targeted coal phase-out as early as possible, natural gas would serve as a bridge technology – towards a new, green electricity world in Germany.
This bridge was to a new electricity world in which renewable energy, especially sun and wind, set the pace. Angela Merkel had already marked this ‘turnaround’ as Chancellor. As “backup” for the dark doldrums, i.e. whenr the sun doesn’t shine enough and the wind doesn’t blow enough, new, highly efficient and, according to Economics Minister Habeck’s wishes, ideally hydrogen – in the future natural gas power plants would step to secure power supply.
This is the plan of the federal government and, above all, its Economics Minister Robert Habeck (Green Party). This plan also has a name: the so-called Power Plant Strategy. This strategy was intended to encourage the construction of new gas power plants in Germany with an output of at least 15 gigawatts, i.e. building at least 30 large power plants by 2030. Even this is quite a challenge. But then came Russia’s war against Ukraine. And then came the Federal Finance Minister’s austerity policy and, most recently, the budget crisis at the end of 2023.
But first things first: The Ukraine war quickly made it clear that natural gas for Germany was essentially only available via pipeline from Norway or in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG) . Chemically speaking, LNG is natural gas, but it is liquid and 162 degrees cold. But it’s also pretty expensive and pretty dirty (sic).
For some, ‘expensive’ is a relative definition these days. Not dirty: In the USA, LNG is obtained through fracking, then has to be cooled down to minus 162 degrees using a lot of energy, and then transported laboriously and with high CO2 emissions across the world’s oceans and on tanker ships that use heavy oil and refinery waste as fuel.
At the North and Baltic Sea ports, the energy is to be fed into the German natural gas pipeline network via floating LNG terminals that were hastily purchased after the outbreak of war. At least one of these terminals had previously been decommissioned in Australia because the floating vehicle was anything but good for the coral reefs off the coast.
With the war, coal-fired power generation became en vogue again
Habeck’s plan for the green transformation of German electricity generation was therefore somewhat tarnished by Putin’s war. But overshadowed by a fog of war and so largely unnoticed by the wider public. Germany would become an LNG importer instead of buying piped natural gas from warmongers. The sabotage of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline was another decision-making event. Habeck’s plan seemed to have no alternative.
In the meantime, the Federal Minister of Economics has encountered a second problem with his plan. This time it’s more directly about money, namely German tax money. After the ministries and coalition partners had agreed on an initial concept for the Power Plant Strategy – which Habeck proudly announced in August – it became clear: As far as EU state aid law is concerned, the power plant strategy is not just massive problem, but it’s also quite expensive: 60 billion euros for 15 years. The Federal Minister of Finance will have already asked if it couldn’t be cheaper. And the question was already in the room: If nuclear power is no longer available to step into the breach, isn’t there an alternative to coal-fired power generation?
Reserve power plants are essentially coal-fired power plants
Then came the budget crisis. The Federal Ministry of Economics told members of the Bundestag’s Energy Committee that the Power Plant Strategy had been "shelved for the short term". In the new plans for the federal budget, with adjustments announced on Wednesday, the financial resources for the strategy have been postponed by two years. So it’s essential for the next election period. Whether the strategy will return and what it may look like is more questionable than ever. It is now clear that this has apparently initiated a shift that could have existential significance for the Greens in the federal government.
In a draft of the SPD parliamentary group’s current work planning for the first half of 2024, which has been seen by the Berliner Zeitung and dated January 4th, the Power Plant Strategy is completely missing. This new work plan also reflects the plans of the Ministry of Economic Affairs led by Habeck. In the previous document for 2023, however, it was still included with the note that the schedule was “open”. Instead, the current SPD document talks about increasing the use of grid reserve power plants.
That sounds harmless to the layperson. Now reserve power plants are essentially coal-fired power plants. To be more precise, they are old power plants that have a good 40 years or more under their belt and whose electricity generation is fuelled by lignite or hard coal. These are power plants that should actually have been decommissioned long ago, but which were forbidden from being shut down by the Federal Network Agency, led by the President Klaus Müller (Green Party), in order to ensure security of supply and electricity network stability.
The likely manouver, which is revealed by the document from the SPD parliamentary group, is anything but without reason: Since the new gas power plants are not materialising as desired, the coal for electricity generation should not only be on the grid under the fig leaf of the reserve remain, but are even used more intensively.
There is undoubtedly rationality in this: the year 2030 is moving more and more out of reach as the desired date for the coal phase-out. But German dependence on expensive and dirty LNG will be reduced. And Germany will be less susceptible to blackmail geopolitically – keyword diversification. Betting everything on LNG would be understandably risky given the US elections.
The question of whether the old coal piles can fulfil their role as a replacement for a failed gas power plant strategy and as a geopolitical bargaining chip is one question – and ultimately, above all, a technical question. The other is whether Habeck and the Green Party will survive in the next elections, having sacrificed the ambitious goals of phasing out coal to such constraints. The plan announced by Habeck in a Maischberger broadcast in October to no longer be dependent on the coal reserve in the winter of 2024/25 is obviously not working. In any case, Habeck now has a lot to explain to his audience.
Translation Net Zero Watch

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As I suggested the other day, regarding the EU’s 2030 targets, reality will trump green fantasy.

In Germany’s case, that means increasing coal power to replace both nuclear and gas power.

Pay particular attention to this gem:

Now reserve power plants are essentially coal-fired power plants. To be more precise, they are old power plants that have a good 40 years or more under their belt and whose electricity generation is fueled by lignite or hard coal. These are power plants that should actually have been decommissioned long ago, but which were forbidden from being shut down by the Federal Network Agency, led by the President Klaus Müller (Green Party), in order to ensure security of supply and electricity network stability.

In other words, the gigantic tranche of new coal power stations built in the last decade will carry on as baseload regardless.

The back up for intermittent renewables will come from 40 year old plants, which should have been shut down already.

But this paragraph has most relevance to the UK:

So how can morons like Skidmore and Miliband possibly justify stopping all further development of North Sea gas, if they really are so concerned about emissions?

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