Andrew Montford: Does the Climate Change Committee understand the energy storage problem?
By Paul Homewood

Yesterday, I reported that four national institutions – the Climate Change Committee (CCC), the National Infrastructure Commission, National Grid, and the Royal Society – have got their energy system modelling wrong and have thus underestimated the cost of Net Zero.
Last night, the CCC’s Chief Executive, Chris Stark put out a long Twitter threadaddressing these issues. But while it’s dressed up as a rebuttal, it’s nothing of the sort. In fact, it’s a masterpiece of bureaucratic obfuscation.
Recall firstly that this blew up when the Sunday Telegraph reported Sir Christopher Llewellyn Smith’s criticisms of the CCC’s energy system modelling: they had failed to look at the possibility of back-to-back low wind years. This meant that they underestimated the amount of hydrogen storage the system would need, and thus the costs involved.
There are 24 tweets in Stark’s thread. On number 10, we get this:
“We could certainly look further at a sequence of years. We are hoping we can do this in later work.”
Clearly then, Stark accepts Sir Christopher’s central point. He would have had to, of course, because he had already done so in correspondence with the Sunday Telegraph’s Ed Malnick, who reported in his article:
“…in response to further questions from this newspaper, the [CCC] admitted that its original recommendations in 2019 about the feasibility of meeting the 2050 net zero target, were also based on just one year’s worth of weather data.”
And since the CCC had the underlying modelling for the 2019 Net Zero report dragged out of them under FOI, we can see in the model itself that only one year’s worth of data is analysed!
But while Stark has to accept the point, in true bureaucratic fashion, he dresses it up so that it appears to be a rebuttal:
* quote tweeting someone saying that the Royal Society’s criticisms are misleading
* calling the Sunday Telegraph piece “nasty” (it isn’t) but not linking to it
* multiple tweets describing the (incorrect) modelling that they did
* claiming to have made a strong rebuttal.
* saying “there’s nothing ‘right or wrong’ here.
* calling it a “silly story”
* etcetera.
Stark introduces a 2023 report, for which he says they looked at five different years of weather data, so he is once again accepting Llewellyn Smith’s central criticism, namely that they haven’t looked at back to back low wind years and will thus have got the costs wrong.
He also says:
“we modelled two sensitivities looking specifically at the impact of low-wind periods (‘wind droughts’) up to 30 days. An understanding of these extremes is essential to system design (although its impact on the overall net zero transition shouldn’t be exaggerated).”
This appears to betray an alarming misunderstanding of the issue. A period of a few weeks with little or no renewable generation (usually referred to as a “dunkelflaute”) is a secondary problem. Dunkelflautes are typically a couple of weeks long, but even one lasting 30 days would only reduce annual output by 10% or so. In simple terms, it would mean that we would need 10% of annual demand in the store at the start of the year.*
I use the term wind “drought” to refer to years in which wind is low over the whole year. In 2021, for example, annual wind output was down 20% or more. To get through a year like that, we’d need 20% of demand in the store. To survive back-to-back wind drought years, we’d need to store 40% of demand (and to have a commensurately larger generation fleet so that we can quickly refill it). Thus the costs will be grossly understated.
That Stark appears not to understand this, even after Llewellyn Smith has explained it to him, should be a cause for concern.
It may be, of course, that bringing dunkelflautes into the thread is just part of his efforts to obfuscate his admission of failure, but we need to be clear. So, does Chris Stark accept that back-to-back wind droughts mean more storage, more generation equipment and higher costs, or doesn’t he?
We need to know.
Comments are closed.
Unfortunately he is far from unique
The answer is either NO and/or they’re liars.
What to do about it though ?
Indeed
Our bought & paid for political class seem inured to any criticism that the path they chose for us – without consultation – is unstoppable.
Maybe hang a few of the diehard net zero zealots from the sails of bird mincers during the next period of calm weather ?
It is a very serious problem when public bodies are either monstrously ignorant and/or utterly intent on pushing transparent lies.
How do you hold their feet to the fire?
… really
Politeness has its limits
Reform UK is the only political party that proposes to do something about it.
That Tice chap needs to be more careful about his publivcity stunts
They’ve confirmed what we all thought. Paywalled
Too hot, too dry, too wet: climate change hits Italy’s winemakers hard
https://www.ft.com/content/2ce398cd-6e5c-47e5-a84a-8f19b1bb9b6b
The FT is, these days, an embarrassment – twaddle typed up by kids for idiots?
I fear that even Net Zero Watch (NZW) have underestimated the problem of wind droughts. Think, for example, of the year 1976 in the UK when there was a 16 week dry spell / heat wave due to a high pressure area dominating most of Europe during the summer months. Such high-pressure areas are typically associated with light winds (dunkelflauten).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1976_British_Isles_heatwave
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1976_European_heatwave
As an electrical engineer I would use, in an area of imperfect knowledge, a safety factor of at least 50%. However, in a safety critical case such as the electricity grid, my initial plan would be to use a safety factor of 100%. Thus if we have already had 16 week wind droughts in the relatively recent past then I would be looking for reliable storage capacity of roughly 2 x 16 weeks i.e. about 30 weeks’ storage based upon data from a single very bad year …
However, Lamb [Ref. 1] has shown that, exactly as NZW claim, dunkelflauten can occur in adjacent years thereby significantly exacerbating the size of the energy storage problem. Furthermore, reference 1 shows that the number of days of the UK’s prevailing Westerly winds are very variable in their annual frequency, varying from about 50 to 120 days per year.
Clearly analysis that relies on a single year’s data woefully underestimates the energy storage problem, as will any analysis that does not consider trends in long-term wind variability.
Reference
1. H. H. Lamb, “”Climate, History and the Modern World”, Routledge, 2nd ed., 1995, at pages 53 and 269.
Regards, John.
Even 37 years is not enough to assess wind speed variability over multiple decades, especially if that period happens to correspond with positive winter NAO and stormier than average weather.
https://jaimejessop.substack.com/p/the-wind-drought-years-which-the
Yes, Jaime, 37 years is far from adequate. Page 53 of Lamb (from which I quoted above) shows the huge variation from 45 days/year in 1785 to over 120 days/year in circa 1923, a temporal span of almost 140 years.
Regards, John.
Germany is giving up on the hydrogen option:
https://www.euractiv.com/section/electricity/news/germanys-dream-of-building-a-fleet-of-hydrogen-fired-power-plants-is-faltering/
“By 2035, Germany wants to produce 100% of its power in a climate-neutral way. To back up wind turbines and solar panels, whose production is expected to dominate in the coming years, the government initially envisioned a fleet of hydrogen-fired power plants.
“As long as the prospect of new backup power plants based on hydrogen does not get off the ground […] the solution in Germany will be the continued operation of coal-fired power plants,” Russwurm told the press on Tuesday (16 January).
Given budgetary constraints, the two industry associations are urging the government to cut corners and ditch plans for hydrogen-fired power plants.
“To significantly reduce complexity and costs,” BDEW stresses the need to “re-evaluate” the role afforded to hydrogen peak and hybrid power plants, due to their expensive components and limited impacts on supply security.”
“This meant that they underestimated the amount of hydrogen storage the system would need, and thus the costs involved.”
And just *where* does Stark think that hydrogen (having the lowest volumetric energy content of any fuel) will be stored?
Just 3 days ago, the Uni of Aberdeen published “Study of decommissioned onshore gas field highlights hydrogen storage concerns”
Amongst other concerns ….
“We used geological data available through the UK Onshore Geophysical Library to critically evaluate the possibility and concluded that the Cousland field fails to meet the criteria for safe subsurface storage”
Professor John Underhill, Director of the University of Aberdeen’s Centre for Energy Transition
https://www.abdn.ac.uk/news/22733/
Out of thin air?
It’s much worse than you thought, Jim!
From the CCC Sixth Carbon Budget Electricity Generation Sector Summary:
For the analysis underpinning this report we used the Department of Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy’s (BEIS) Dynamic Dispatch Model (DDM). We supplemented this with additional analysis to reflect the use of evidence and analyses that were not supported by the model.
BEIS Dynamic Dispatch Model
The DDM is an electricity market model that considers electricity demand and supply in Great Britain on a half-hourly basis. The model estimates the merit order of plants, which is then matched to demand.
• The model takes into account demand profiles of different end users as well as weather patterns for sample days
Demand inputs included assumptions on flexibility provided by heat and transport (Box 1.11 in Chapter 1). We assumed that pre-heating and hot water tanks enable certain homes to shift their electricity demand four hours away from peak, while homes with storage heaters can shift their demand at all times.
Does that mean until the cold weather is over?
The use for storage in their modelling is effectively no more than intra day. They did commission the following study from Jacobs:
Jacobs (2020) Strategy for Long-Term Energy Storage in the UK.
Click to access Jacobs-Strategy-for-Long-Term-Energy-Storage-in-UK-August-2020.pdf
A future projection for the expected situation in
2030 and 2050 has been prepared by factoring
the 2018 Elexon data to reflect the predicted
generation capacities and demand projections
given for the Two Degrees and Net Zero future
energy scenarios.
Note that the FES scenarios provide total
generation demand forecasts on an annual basis
for 2030 and 2050, but not the hourly, daily,
weekly or seasonal distributions for these demand
projections. Thus, we have used the Elexon actual
generation data for 2018 as a proxy for the likely
generation variability (in percentage terms) for
future years. Clearly the demand variability in the
future will not be exactly the same as it is now,
The FES scenarios are the NGESO Future Energy Scenarios that I have debunked many a time and oft. So we have 2018 demand patterns, and 2018 wind and solar generation used as the basis for isolated 2030 and 2050 years, not a continuous run of years including difficult periods such as 2010-11 with low renewables output and cold weather increasing demand: there is NO allowance for the effects of using electricity for heating, or for the effects of charging EVs etc..
The purpose of this modeling exercise has been
to show how the provision of additional longterm
storage could not only assist in balancing
the future planned nuclear and intermittent
renewables capacity, but also reduce the
dependency on CCGT backup generation, fitted
with CCS, that would otherwise be required.
It doesn’t even pretend to address the real problem, which it fails to identify – all it is concerned to do is to show how some storage could reduce curtailment in a pretty average year.
Just to emphasize the failure to grasp the problem they say:
Analyses carried out by Jacobs for the levelized
generation cost study produced for the (DECC)
in 2015/16 showed that to provide the necessary
support for intermittent wind generation, as installed
at that time, would require the development of at
least a further 5 GW of long-term (deep) storage
with a total energy storage capacity of some 1,500
GWh overall. With the predicted acceleration in the
development of off-shore wind generation, in order
to meet the UK Government’s target of net zero
carbon emissions by 2050, this will likely require the
implementation of still further long-term energy
storage to maximize the effective firm capacity of
the total installed intermittent renewables.
1.5TWh is basically the volume of wind constraints in 2017, so it seems the study was calibrated to wind constraint payments at that time. The idea that curtailment would increase radically as renewables capacity is increased simply never entered their head.
They have no need to understand anything except the role they have and the agenda they are there to support and promote. They are protected from reproach and I am sure are all promised nice fat cheques as long as they stay on message.
So what’s the problem ? That honest, reliable, upright Mr Stark assures us
“..although its impact (missing apostrophe Mr Stark) on the overall net zero transition shouldn’t be exaggerated”. Problem solved (apparently).
It’s obfuscation. It’s easy to get to Net Zero. Getting there without destroying the economy is the issue.
Thanks Tomo for posting this concise article of how big the lie is.
Net Zero, means that there is no net CO2 produced. Which means that there has to be viable mechanisms to storm CO2 to offset any and every means to produce CO2. Which means, NOT that CO2 has to be reduced, but that CO2 production has to be eliminated, unless or until there is any means to reduce CO2.
There is no viable way to reduce of lock up CO2. So, under net Zero, there is no permissible way to produce CO2. Which means the entire modern economy has to be ditched.
Whilst the Met Office and the BBC love to go on about stormy weather, the news on overall levels of wind is much less encouraging. Orsted was forced to issue a profits warning when it predicted falling wind levels in 2021. The IPCC predicts falling wind levels in Europe.
https://bigthink.com/strange-maps/europe-wind-drought/
There are numerous scenarios that should be looked at. Wind at say 60% capacity over 3 months combined with a CCGT plant in unscheduled maintenance and problems with interconnectors would be disastrous for example. The essential point is that we are putting ourselves at the mercy of something we have absolutely no means of controlling with virtually no means of mitigation. That us utterly stupid.
“Wind drought…”, did somebody say…
https://news.sky.com/story/future-of-renewable-energy-in-balance-as-uk-suffers-wind-drought-with-global-stilling-to-come-12766917
“UK and western Europe in middle of a wind drought – and a ‘global stilling’ is coming
The UK is gambling on wind in the future of renewables – but as we’re seeing, having the turbines doesn’t make them turn.”