Fake News From The New Yorker
By Paul Homewood
h/t Joe Public
Fake news from the New Yorker:
Ako Salemi took the first photographs of his career when he was a teen-ager, growing up in northern Iran. His earliest subject, a river near his family’s home, is now mostly dirt. In Salemi’s native country, as in much of the water-scarce Middle East, climate change has led to desiccation. Lake Urmia, once the sixth-largest saline lake in the world, now has just ten per cent of the water that it contained in the nineteen-seventies. (Salemi’s childhood river was one of its tributaries.) The sea level along the country’s southern coastline, meanwhile, where most of its oil and petrochemical infrastructure is located, is projected to rise more than two feet by the end of the century, and by 2070 could flood the homes of more than two hundred thousand people annually. And yet Salemi told me that many of his compatriots aren’t really aware of global warming. “They know about droughts and the lack of water resources, but they don’t know why these things are happening,” he said…..
Unlike President-elect Donald Trump, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has said that he believes that fossil-fuel consumption is the main driver of climate change. Last year, he signed the Paris climate agreement, and his government has committed to reducing Iran’s greenhouse-gas emissions by four per cent, or up to twelve per cent if the United States reverses its sanctions against the country
In fact, as an article in the Handbook of Engineering Hydrology published in 2014 explained, the shrinking of Lake Urmia has nothing to do with climate change:
Iran is a semi-arid country, and there have always been droughts from time to time, like the one in 2000/01, since when rainfall have increased:
The Encyclopedia Iranica has some of the history of droughts:
FAMINES. Famines have been reported throughout Persian history by numerous authors and observers. According to a compilation made by Charles Melville, they occurred in Khorasan in 115/733 (Melville, p. 130), in Sīstān in 220/835 (Melville, p. 130), in Khorasan and Sīstān in 400/1009-10 (Melville, p. 136), in Khorasan in 1099 (Melville, p. 136), in Kermān in 576/1180 and 662/1264 (Melville, p. 130), in Fārs in 683-85/1284-66 and 698/1299 (Melville, p. 130), in Yazd in 858/1454 (Melville, p. 130), and throughout Persia in 1870-72 (Melville p. 130), 1929-30 (Melville, p. 138), and 1948-49 (Melville, pp. 138-39). To these should be added the years 735/1335 sqq. (Aubin, pp.131-32), 1226/1811 (Morier, I, p. 170), 1232/1817 (Johnson, I, pp.195-97), 1277/1861 (Brugsch, II, pp. 307, 364-65 and passim), 1296/1879 (Wilson) and “the beginning of the 20th century” (Malcolm, pp. 233, 235-36). However, this enumeration probably remains very incomplete as more or less recurrent episodes of famine have plagued various parts of Persia until the middle of the 20th century. “Hardly a year passes in which there is not a famine in some province of Persia,” wrote a European observer in the beginning of the 20th century (Chirol, p. 97)…
Causes. The territories of Persia and Afghanistan comprise vast, desertic or semi-desertic, regions where the natural variation in precipitation is considerable (see BĀRĀN). Rain water agriculture, which provides an important part of the food resources, is thus especially vulnerable. Drought is obviously the most frequent cause of famine, as was the case in several of the famines mentioned by Melville…
The great famine of 1870-72, the best documented one (Smith, passim; Brittlebank, passim; St. John, pp. 94-98; Bellew, passim, Fasāʾī, pp. 327 sqq.; Eṣfahānī, pp. 281-82; Wazīrī, p. 214), was thus the result of a series of combined climatic catastrophes made worse by poor administration and the human factors previously cited. Since 1863-64, and except for 1865-66, rainfall had regularly been below average. The output of qanats and springs had fallen. The winter of 1869-70 had once again had very little snow and rain, especially in the low plains of Fārs, where herds of nomads who where there during that season suffered greatly. Camels and goats survived, however, and allowed the more prosperous nomads to reach the highlands in spring. Many of the poor ones died. At the end of 1870, famished crowds flocked to Bušehr.
The New Yorker cannot even get Iran’s Paris pledge correct. They claim that Iran has promised to reduce Iran’s greenhouse-gas emissions by four per cent.
In fact all that is promised is a reduction of 4% from Business as Usual, which they don’t even bother to quantify.
In the meantime, Iran’s emissions of CO2 are actually 44% greater the the UK’s. Much of this arises from the use of gas to heat people’s homes during the bitter winters they have there.
And the whole economy revolves around the production of oil and gas.
The New Yorker would like to take all that away, and send the Iranians back to the Middle Ages.